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1. Introduction
A group’s performance is often constrained by
its lowest-performing individual. An assembly line
moves no faster than the slowest person in the line, a
report does not get finished until the last person com-
pletes his section, and a meeting cannot start when
a key attendee is late. Groups with such strong com-
plementarities can easily become stuck in a perfor-
mance trap: everyone understands that all would ben-
efit if all group members put forth their best effort,
but, since no individual can unilaterally change the
outcome for the better, all group members shirk in
the belief that any attempt to break out of the perfor-
mance trap is wasted effort.
When a firm (or any organization) is stuck in a per-
formance trap, spontaneous escape is unlikely given
the need for coordinated change. Leadership is usu-
ally required—somebody has to take the initiative to
start the process of change. Managerial leadership
is an obvious possibility, but leadership by workers
can also play an important role. Help, defined as a
voluntary activity by high-ability types that makes the
job of low-ability types easier at some cost for the
high-ability types, is a natural instrument that work-
ers can use to provide leadership.1 Intuitively, work
teams often contain some workers that have higher
ability than others. If workers are rewarded based
on team production, then high-ability workers might
have an incentive to help their less able colleagues.2
Help between workers has received little attention
1 Other natural instruments that can be used to lead the way out
of a performance trap include leading by example (Brandts and
Cooper 2006, Hyndman et al. 2009) and communication (Blume and
Ortmann 2007, Brandts and Cooper 2007).
2 Hamilton et al. (2003, 2012) provide a real-world example of this.
They study the productivity of worker teams in a garment plant.
Teams with heterogeneous abilities become more productive as the
spread in ability increases (holding the average fixed). Hamilton
et al. conjecture that this is due to mutual learning, a specific form
of help where high-ability types help low-ability types understand
how work should be done and pull them up to a higher level.
2916
Brandts et al.: Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games
Management Science 62(10), pp. 2916–2936, © 2016 INFORMS 2917
from researchers in economics and management.3
To the best of our knowledge, there exist no previous
experimental papers on the topic of help.
The purpose of this paper is to present laboratory
experiments exploring the use of help as a leader-
ship tool. The provision and impact of help are com-
plex phenomena involving the interplay between the
effects of material incentives, beliefs, and nonpecu-
niary motivations. Laboratory experiments are well
suited for studying settings where such factors inter-
act.4 The advantages of laboratory experiments for
studying help include the control and observability
available in experimental settings. We exogenously
control whether help is possible and directly observe
how much help is provided. We can therefore cleanly
determine whether help is responsible for observed
changes in performance as opposed to other factors.
We can also observe the details of the interactive pro-
cess of giving help and reacting to help, rather than
only observing the final outcome, all of which makes
it possible to pin down the mechanism by which help
affects performance. Although it is risky to general-
ize conclusions from a lab experiment to managerial
choices in field settings, we believe that laboratory
experiments are a valid tool for studying the effects
of help.
Our experimental results show that help is only
effective if high-ability types are forced to com-
mit to providing help for an extended period of
time. To explain this result, we develop and esti-
mate a structural model of learning that includes
sophisticated learners. This exercise indicates that the
root cause of poor performance with help, in the
absence of forced commitment, is “overoptimism”
by high-ability types: believing incorrectly that they
have taught others to play an efficient equilibrium,
high-ability types tend to prematurely abandon the
provision of help. This finding has implications for
leadership in many settings and helps to explain puz-
zling patterns from other studies of leadership.
Getting into the details, our experiments are based
on the “corporate turnaround game.”5 This is an
3 See Drago and Garvey (1998) for a questionnaire study on the
effects of promotion incentives on help. See also Brown and
Heywood (2009) for a field study on help in settings with individ-
ual performance pay and Antonetti and Rufini (2008) for a theoret-
ical analysis of training of low-ability types by high-ability types.
4 For examples, see Zwick and Chen (1999), Brandts and
Charness (2003), Weber and Camerer (2003), and Harbring and
Irlenbusch (2011).
5 The corporate turnaround game was introduced by Brandts and
Cooper (2006). See also Hamman et al. (2007). More broadly,
there exists an extensive literature on coordination in weak-link
games. Camerer (2003) surveys the early literature. Prominent
recent papers include Chaudhuri et al. (2006), Weber (2006), Blume
and Ortmann (2007), and Kogan et al. (2011).
experimental setting designed to represent a corpo-
rate environment in which a group has fallen into a
performance trap and needs to escape from it. The
game involves repeated play between a “manager”
and four “employees” of a “firm.” We automate the
role of the manager while employees are played by
experimental subjects. In each round, the manager
first chooses a bonus rate, which determines the frac-
tion of the firm’s profits transferred to the employees.
After seeing the bonus rate, the four employees simul-
taneously choose how much costly effort to expend
with firm output and profits determined by the mini-
mum effort. It is critical to note that the four employ-
ees are not identical. Instead, each group has one
high-ability type with relatively low effort costs and
three identical low-ability types with relatively high
effort costs.
Employees initially face a low bonus rate that
makes the minimum possible effort a dominant strat-
egy for low-ability types, trapping groups in the
worst outcome possible. The bonus rate is then exoge-
nously increased, turning the game into a weak-link
game (Van Huyck et al. 1990) with multiple Pareto-
ranked equilibria. Even with this change in incen-
tives, the strong complementarities between workers’
efforts make a spontaneous escape from the perfor-
mance trap far from certain since improved perfor-
mance requires a unanimous switch to higher effort.
The key issue in our paper is whether high-ability
types can use help to assist the group’s escape from
the performance trap. We study two specific kinds
of help, indirect and direct. We first consider indirect
help, which involves high-ability types improving the
productivity of low types at the cost of decreasing
their own productivity. We refer to this as “indirect”
because high-ability workers do not spend time on
the low-ability workers’ task but instead make it pos-
sible for the low-ability workers to accomplish their
tasks more efficiently. High-ability types can gain by
providing indirect help, even though their productiv-
ity is lowered, if low-ability types increase their effort
enough that the group escapes its performance trap.
We defer introducing the direct help treatment until
later, as the motivation for this treatment grew out of
the results for the indirect help treatment.
An initial set of treatments (Experiment 1) includes
four treatments that vary the ability of high-ability
types to provide indirect help. In the Endogenous
Help treatment, the high-ability worker can help his
low-ability coworkers and the level of help can be
changed on a round-to-round basis. Behavior in this
treatment is compared with outcomes from two con-
trol treatments, one where help is not possible (No
Help) and one where symmetric costs are imposed
exogenously for the remainder of the interaction
(Symmetric Costs). More precisely, the latter treatment
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imposes the same cost structure as occurs when the
high-ability type chooses a sufficiently high level of
help as to equalize effort costs. We find that the ability
to provide symmetric help on a round-to-round basis
has no positive effect on the likelihood of efficient
coordination as minimum effort levels are lower in
the Endogenous Help treatment than in either the No
Help or Symmetric Costs treatments, albeit weakly in
the first case.
This surprisingly poor performance reflects neither
a failure to use help nor a lack of responsiveness by
minimum effort to changes in help. Instead, the prob-
lem seems to stem from allowing high-ability types to
change their level of help on a round-by-round basis.
Many high-ability types frequently shift the amount
of help they provide up and down, causing the mini-
mum effort to ratchet downward for the group since
the negative response to cutting help is stronger than
the positive effect of increasing help. This suggests
that high-ability types would do better if they com-
mitted to a level of help for an extended time period,
but the Endogenous Help treatment is insufficient to
reach this conclusion since high-ability types might be
changing help frequently because their group is doing
badly. In other words, there is a possibility of reverse
causality.
The final treatment of Experiment 1, Forced Com-
mitment, addresses this by forcing high-ability types
to commit to their chosen level of help (including zero
help) for an extended period of time. Forced Com-
mitment yields significantly higher minimum effort
levels than either the Endogenous Help or the No
Help treatments. Exogenously imposing commitment
makes it easier to escape a performance trap because
it gives groups time to equilibrate before help can be
changed. Having stabilized at an efficient outcome,
subsequent reductions in help have little effect on the
effort of low-ability types.
We develop and estimate a structural model that
provides an explanation for why high-ability types
reduce help too rapidly in the Endogenous Help treat-
ment, and, by extension, captures the main treatment
effects observed in Experiment 1. This is a simpli-
fied version of the sophisticated experience-weighted
attraction (EWA) model of Camerer et al. (2002), com-
bining the spirit of level-k reasoning with a learning
model. Learning models are inherently dynamic and
hence well suited to studying the dynamic phenom-
ena observed in our data.6 Including sophisticated
learners in the model allows for individuals who
anticipate learning and optimization by others. With-
out this, it becomes difficult to explain why help is
6 Crawford and Broseta (1998) provide a notable example of using a
learning model to track data from coordination game experiments.
used by high-ability types, let alone why it is switched
frequently.
Subjects are assumed to be one of two types, unso-
phisticated or sophisticated learners. Note that a sub-
ject being of high (low) ability does not imply that
he or she is a sophisticated (unsophisticated) learner,
as the former is randomly and exogenously assigned
by the experimenters, whereas the latter is a behav-
ioral characteristic of the individual. As will be seen,
the case of greatest interest occurs when sophisti-
cated learners are assigned to the high-ability role,
as sophistication affects their use of help. Unsophis-
ticated learners follow a simple rule closely akin to
Cournot learning. Sophisticated learners noisily opti-
mize versus unsophisticated learners and are for-
ward looking. Sophisticated learners anticipate the
effect of changing incentives on others’ behavior and
understand the benefits of strategic teaching.7 For
high-ability types who are also sophisticated learn-
ers, help is an attractive tool. By giving short-term
incentives for higher effort, help not only changes
the behavior of low-ability types in the short run but
also affects the experiences on which their learning
is based. This pushes the learning dynamic toward
equilibria with coordination at higher levels of effort.
Two additional features were added to the model
based on specific features of our data: (1) overopti-
mism, where sophisticated learners overestimate their
ability to affect the beliefs of unsophisticated types,
and (2) reciprocity, where low-ability workers reward
kindness (increased help) by choosing higher effort
levels and punish unkind behavior (decreased help)
by moving to lower effort levels.
To generate predictions from the model, we fit
its parameters using data from the three treatments
we are trying to track: No Help, Endogenous Help,
and Forced Commitment. The estimation is done via
the simulated method of moments, minimizing the
squared difference between the observed and simu-
lated minimum effort averaging across periods and
treatments. The resulting parameters give the best
fit averaging across treatments, but it does not fol-
low that the model tracks differences between treat-
ments especially well, and it is easy to generate
examples where models fit to the data make inaccu-
rate predictions about differences between treatments.
Indeed, if we fit a version of the learning model with
overoptimism and reciprocity removed and then sim-
ulate data for all three treatments using the estimated
parameters, the constrained model fails to predict that
forced commitment increases minimum effort rela-
tive to no help and endogenous help. Performing
7 Strategic teaching refers to attempts to alter others’ future choices
by manipulating their learning processes. For experimental evi-
dence of strategic teaching, see Terracol and Vaksmann (2009),
Hyndman et al. (2009), Fehr et al. (2012), and Hyndman et al. (2012).
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the same fitting and simulation exercise with the full
unconstrained model (i.e., including overoptimism
and reciprocity), the simulations successfully track the
differences between these three treatments. The esti-
mated parameter for overoptimism is significant and
positive, but, surprisingly, the estimated reciprocity
parameter is tiny and not significant. Overoptimism
helps the model track the data because it increases
the use of help and, more importantly, leads to pre-
mature reductions of help as observed in the data.
A high-ability type who is sophisticated and overop-
timistic will abandon help too rapidly, believing he
has led his group to the efficient equilibrium before
this has actually occurred. Reciprocity is a power-
ful force in many experimental settings (see Cooper
and Kagel 2016), but adding a simple, natural ver-
sion of reciprocity to our model harms its ability to
track the data. In our model, sophisticated learners
believe the other subjects are unsophisticated learn-
ers who noisily optimize subject to beliefs. If reci-
procity is added to the model, the objective function
of low-ability types changes. A high-ability type who
is sophisticated anticipates that reciprocity affects the
choices of low-ability types, expecting a more posi-
tive effect when help is increased and a more negative
effect when help is reduced. Similar to overoptimism,
adding reciprocity increases usage of help, but unlike
overoptimism, reciprocity makes reducing help less
attractive. This limits the model’s ability to capture
the overly rapid reductions of help that play such an
important role in our data.
To recapitulate, we learn three important things
from the structural model: (1) sophisticated learners
must be included to generate use of help, (2) adding
overoptimism allows the model to track the dif-
ferences between treatments by causing high-ability
types to abandon help too quickly, and (3) adding
reciprocity does not help the model track the data
because this feature discourages high-ability types
from abandoning help too quickly.
Experiment 1 studies indirect help, but this is just
one of many possible ways in which help could be
provided. To study whether the importance of com-
mitment generalizes to other natural versions of help,
Experiment 2 examines “direct” help. This involves
high-ability types spending time on the low-ability
types’ task, allowing the low-ability types to do less
work to complete their tasks. Help is direct because
high-ability workers do a portion of the low-ability
types’ work rather than making it easier for low-
ability types to do their own work as with indirect
help. Experiment 2 studies direct help with and with-
out forced commitment. In the first treatment, high-
ability types choose help on a round-by-round basis,
whereas in the second, they commit to their cho-
sen level of help for an extended period of time.
Without commitment, the effect of allowing direct
help is negative, with minimum effort levels greatly
reduced relative to the relevant control, the No Help
treatment. Forced commitment again improves per-
formance. The reasons for this improvement parallel
those from the indirect help treatments. The results of
Experiment 2 reinforce our main conclusion: the effi-
cacy of help as an instrument for leading groups out
of performance traps depends critically on the com-
mitment of leaders to providing help.
More broadly, our theoretical and experimental
results suggest that stable behavior is a characteris-
tic of successful leadership with a broad variety of
tools employed for escaping performance traps. For
example, in Brandts and Cooper (2007), leadership
could be exercised by managers, played by subjects
rather than the computer, who controlled the bonus
rate. The bonus rate was changed by managers in
almost 2/3 of the periods. Managers who were below
the median frequency of switching earned about 50%
more than managers at or above the median (398 ver-
sus 260 experimental currency units (ECUs)/round).8
This parallels the negative effect resulting from exces-
sive switching of help observed in the endogenous
help and direct help treatments. The insight is the
same in all cases. Recoordinating on a good equi-
librium is a gradual process. Once this process has
finished, the good outcome can persist even if incen-
tives are changed, but if incentives change before
equilibration has a chance to occur, then coordina-
tion on a good equilibrium may likely not occur.
Institutions that tie leaders’ hands can have a posi-
tive effect by preventing premature abandonment of
costly yet effective instruments for overcoming coor-
dination failure.
2. The Turnaround Game and
Indirect Help
The turnaround game is played by a fixed group
(“firm”) consisting of a manager and four employees
who interact repeatedly over a number of rounds. The
firm’s productivity in each round is determined by
employees’ effort choices for the round, with employ-
ees’ incentives to exert effort depending on an ex ante
profit sharing decision made by the manager. In the
experiments reported below, the experimenter plays
the role of manager, whereas experimental subjects
fill the roles of the employees. Since our focus is on
interactions between high- and low-ability employ-
ees, making the manager exogenous generates a more
controlled environment to study their relations. Even
8 This figure pools data from all three treatments with subjects play-
ing as managers and controlling the bonus rate. The three treat-
ments varied the ability of managers and workers to communicate.
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though the manager’s decisions are exogenous, it is
useful for expositional purposes to treat her as a
player in the game.
The turnaround game embodies three basic design
choices. First, the firm’s technology has a weak-link
structure, with production (as well as profits) depend-
ing in every round on the minimum effort chosen by
an employee. No employee can unilaterally increase
the firm’s production. Second, the manager observes
the output produced and, hence, observes the mini-
mum effort but does not observe any of the individ-
ual effort levels. This implies that any incentives the
manager gives employees cannot depend on individ-
ual effort. Finally, the firm manager can only reward
employees with bonuses based on the minimum effort
observed. She can change this bonus rate but can-
not otherwise influence the employees’ choices. In
what follows, we present the main features of the
turnaround game in more detail.
An experimental firm in the turnaround game con-
sists of a fixed grouping of four subjects (employ-
ees) who interact for 30 consecutive rounds, broken
into three 10-round blocks. Each block starts with the
announcement of a common bonus rate (B) for the
10 rounds of the block that determines how much
additional pay each employee receives for each unit
increase in the minimum effort of the four employees.
While playing in a block with a particular bonus rate,
subjects did not know what the bonus rate would
be in subsequent 10-round blocks. The bonus trans-
fers part of the firm’s profits from the manager to
the employees. All four employees observe B and
then simultaneously choose effort levels, where Ei
is the effort level chosen by the ith employee. We
restrict an employee’s effort to be in 10-hour incre-
ments: Ei ∈ 801101201301409. Intuitively, employees
spend 40 hours per week on the job, and effort mea-
sures the number of these hours that they actually
work hard rather than loafing. Employees’ payoffs are
determined by Equation (1) below. Note that effort is
costly, with Ci denoting the cost of a unit of effort
for the ith employee. All payoffs are denominated in
ECUs. These were converted to monetary payoffs at
a rate of one euro equal to 500 ECUs:
Employee i2  ie = 200 −CiEi +
(
B× min
j∈811213149
4Ej5
)
0
In all treatments, the average cost of effort equals
7 (i.e., 1/44C1 + C2 + C3 + C45 = 75. Employee 1 is a
high-ability type with a low initial effort cost, C1 = 1,
whereas the other three employees are low-ability
types with high initial effort costs, C2 = C3 = C4 = 9.
In treatments with help, as described in §3, the final
effort costs will differ from these as a function of how
much help is provided.
Table 1 Employee i’s Payoff Tables for B = 8
Minimum effort by other employees
Effort by
employee i 0 10 20 30 40
Ci = 1
0 200 200 200 200 200
10 190 270 270 270 270
20 180 260 340 340 340
30 170 250 330 410 410
40 160 240 320 400 480
Ci = 9
0 200 200 200 200 200
10 110 190 190 190 190
20 20 100 180 180 180
30 −70 10 90 170 170
40 −160 −80 0 80 160
In all treatments, the first 10 rounds were played
with B = 8 and without the possibility of help. Table 1
shows the resulting payoffs for the two ability types
for the case of B = 8. With B = 8, the game is not a
weakest-link game. For a high-ability (low-cost) type,
the best response depends on the minimum effort
of the other workers, but for low-ability (high-cost)
types, it is a dominant strategy to choose zero effort.
In the unique Nash equilibrium, all employees exert
zero effort. We use the game with B = 8 in the first
block of 10 rounds to get play stuck in a performance
trap. This cannot be classified as coordination failure
since there is a unique equilibrium but sets a strong
precedent of low effort for games where coordination
at high effort is possible in equilibrium.
The final 20 rounds in all treatments are played
with B = 14. Table 2 shows the new payoff tables
for the two types of employees if effort costs are
held fixed at their original levels. The game is now a
weakest-link game. Coordination by all four employ-
ees on any of the five available effort levels is an
equilibrium, but consider the incentives faced by
employees if they try to move upward from the
Table 2 Employee i’s Payoff Tables for B = 14
Minimum effort by other employees
Effort by
employee i 0 10 20 30 40
Ci = 1
0 200 200 200 200 200
10 190 330 330 330 330
20 180 320 460 460 460
30 170 310 450 590 590
40 160 300 440 580 720
Ci = 9
0 200 200 200 200 200
10 110 250 250 250 250
20 20 160 300 300 300
30 −70 70 210 350 350
40 −160 −20 120 260 400
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lowest minimum effort level. For simplicity, assume
that all employees choose 0 or 40. For a high-ability
(low-cost) type, the incentives are fairly good. Increas-
ing effort to 40 incurs a sunk effort cost of 40 ECUs
in exchange for a potential gain of 520 ECUs. For this
increase to have positive expected value, the prob-
ability of the three low-ability (high-cost) types all
increasing to effort level 40 must only be greater than
1/14. The odds are more foreboding for low-ability
(high-cost) types. They must sink an effort cost of 360
ECUs and can only potentially gain 200 ECUs. For a
positive expected payoff, the probability of the high-
ability type and both low-ability types increasing their
effort to 40 must be greater than 9/14. Low-ability
types must be far more optimistic than high-ability
types to be willing to take the risk of increasing their
effort levels.
The advantage of high-ability (low-cost) types only
matters if they can get low-ability (high-cost) types to
increase their effort. The flip side of high-ability types
having good incentives to try to coordinate is that
they also have strong incentives to try to influence
the turnaround process. They can do this by helping
low-ability types.
3. Experiment 1: The Effect of
Indirect Help
There are many ways in which workers can help each
other, and no one experiment can capture all of the
possibilities. We sought kinds of help that were easily
implemented in the context of the turnaround game,
did not fundamentally change the nature of the game
being played, and had natural analogs in relevant
field settings. When implementing help in our experi-
ment, we made choices along several dimensions. We
restricted ourselves to implementations where help is
“efficiency neutral,” meaning the total surplus at the
efficient equilibrium is unaffected by the provision of
help. Our goal was to emphasize the use of help as
a leadership tool rather than as a means of directly
improving productivity. We also restricted ourselves
to types of help that have a temporary effect on costs
rather than a permanent one. Using help with a tem-
porary effect goes hand in hand with making help
efficiency neutral. It also simplifies the dynamic opti-
mization problem facing subjects. We want subjects
focused on the trade-off between the current costs of
help and the long-term gains from coordinating on an
efficient equilibrium without also needing to consider
the long-term implications for effort costs. Finally,
both indirect and direct help have natural interpre-
tations in the context of escaping performance traps.
We examine indirect help first.
We model indirect help as a voluntary activity
by which the high-ability (low-effort-cost) worker
reduces the effort cost of a low-ability (high-effort-
cost) type at the expense of increasing his own effort
cost. To make this more concrete, imagine an expe-
rienced worker who volunteers to keep an eye on
a junior colleague. She stops what she is doing
occasionally to check on her colleague. Perhaps she
catches a mistake before it becomes difficult (and time
consuming) to fix. The junior colleague does his own
work, but the advice from his senior colleague makes
it easier for him to do it. Of course, this has a cost
for the person giving advice, since she must take time
and focus away from her own work to monitor her
colleague.
To make indirect help efficiency neutral, we model
the cost of help as being 1 to 1—lowering a low-ability
type’s effort cost by one unit raises the high-ability
type’s effort cost by one unit. For example, if the high-
ability worker decides to reduce the effort cost of all
three low-ability workers by one unit, the effort cost
of these three workers decreases from 9 to 8, whereas
the effort cost of the high-ability worker increases
from 1 to 1 + 43 × 15= 4. To simplify the experiment,
low-ability types are not allowed to help others. Only
allowing one player to provide help eliminates addi-
tional coordination problems such as who is supposed
to be providing leadership if more than one individ-
ual provides it.
Experiment 1 comprises a total of four treatments,
which are summarized in Table 3. The results of
the first three treatments led us to the conjecture
that commitment is crucial for performance improve-
ment. The fourth treatment, Forced Commitment, is
designed to demonstrate that there is a causal rela-
tionship between commitment and escaping a perfor-
mance trap. We defer describing this treatment until
after the results of the first three treatments have been
presented.
All treatments in Experiment 1 are identical in
rounds 1–10 but vary with respect to how the effort
costs are determined in rounds 11–30. Recall that dur-
ing the first 10 rounds, effort costs were exogenously
fixed in all treatments at C1 = 1, C2 = C3 = C4 = 9. In
the No Help treatment, help is not possible and effort
costs remained exogenously fixed at the initial lev-
els throughout rounds 11–30. In the Endogenous Help
treatment, the high-ability employee (employee 1)
has, in rounds 11–30, the option of providing each
low-ability employee (employees 2–4) with 0, 1, 2, 3,
or 4 units of help (H ∈ 811213149) before effort deci-
sions for the current round are made. In other words,
the high-ability-type worker commits to one of the
possible levels of help for the current round but not
for future rounds. To keep matters simple, each low-
ability type must be given the same amount of help.
After each round, all employees are informed about
effort choices in the round.
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Table 3 List of Treatments in Experiment 1
Treatment name No Help Endogenous Help Symmetric Costs Forced Commitment
Player 1 cost block 1 1 1 1 1
Player 1 cost blocks 2 and 3 1 1 + 3H 7 1 + 3H
H ∈ 811213149 (H fixed for block)
H ∈ 811213149
Players 2–4 cost block 1 9 9 9 9
Players 2–4 cost blocks 2 and 3 9 9 −H 7 9 −H
H ∈ 811213149 (H fixed for block)
Number of firms 20 39 20 20
(number of sessions) (2) (5) (2) (2)
For the first three levels of help, used in 94% of all
observations, offering help corresponds to
a. (H = 0) leaving the effort cost distribution at 1,
9, 9, 9;
b. (H = 1) reducing each of the three coworker’s
effort cost by 1 and increasing own effort cost by 3,
leading to a cost distribution of 4, 8, 8, 8; or
c. (H = 2) reducing each of the three coworker’s
effort cost by 2 and increasing own effort cost by 6,
leading to a distribution of 7, 7, 7, 7.
Help levels 3 and 4 modify the distribution of
effort costs in an analogous way. At these help levels,
employee 1 assists the others so much that her costs
of effort are higher than those of low-ability types. It
is therefore not surprising that in our results the use
of help levels 3 and 4 is rare.
In the Symmetric Costs treatment, the distribution
of effort costs is exogenously switched for blocks 2
and 3 to the symmetric distribution with a common
effort cost of 7. This is equivalent to exogenously
imposing H = 2, although without any of the inten-
tionality (and hence the scope for reciprocity) that
may be attributed to the active provision of help.
Effort costs in the Symmetric Costs treatment were
held constant for 10-round blocks, a fact that was
common knowledge among employees. In this treat-
ment there is effectively a commitment to H = 2 for
the 10-round block.
Section 6 contains a formal model designed to
explore why forced commitment increases minimum
effort levels while endogenous help does not, but our
original hypothesis about the differences between the
No Help and Endogenous Help treatments was more
intuitive in nature. Help, whether provided endoge-
nously or imposed exogenously, does not change the
basic structure of the resulting game. Any subgame
that occurs after choosing a level of help is still a
weakest-link game with five Pareto-ranked equilib-
ria, but the costs and benefits of trying to coordinate
on an efficient equilibrium are changed. For exam-
ple, set H = 2. This is the level of help imposed in
the Symmetric Costs treatment and the most common
level of help provided in the Endogenous Help treat-
ment. The resulting payoff table is shown in Table 4.
(There is only one payoff table since all players have
an effort cost of 7.) Consider the incentives to move
from 0 to 40. This requires a (sunk) effort cost of
280 ECUs versus a potential gain of 280 ECUs. To
have a positive expected payoff, the probability of all
three other players increasing their effort to 40 must
be greater than 1/2. This is an improvement over the
equivalent figure of 9/14 for low-ability types in the
absence of help. Incentives are worsened for high-
ability types compared with H = 0, but we conjecture
that they provide help in the expectation of changing
the behavior of low-ability types and hence should
be willing to provide high effort even with lowered
incentives.
Hypothesis 1. Minimum effort will be higher in the
Endogenous Help treatment than in the No Help treatment.
4. Procedures
Subjects were students of the University of Valencia
recruited through an electronic recruitment system.
All sessions were run at the LINEEX computer lab of
the University of Valencia. Subjects were only allowed
to participate in a single session and had no previous
experience in similar experiments.
At the beginning of each session subjects were ran-
domly seated. Printed instructions were distributed
and read aloud by the experimenter. The instruc-
tions stressed that there are two types of employees
with differing payoff tables and that the groups were
fixed for the duration of the experiment. Before begin-
ning play, all subjects were asked to complete a short
Table 4 Employee Payoff Tables with B = 14 and Ci = 7 for
All Employees
Minimum effort by other employees
Effort by
employee i 0 10 20 30 40
0 200 200 200 200 200
10 130 270 270 270 270
20 60 200 340 340 340
30 −10 130 270 410 410
40 −80 60 200 360 480
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quiz about the payoffs and the rules of the experi-
ment. The instructions for the Endogenous Help treat-
ment are shown in Online Appendix A (available as
supplemental material at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/
mnsc.2015.2269).
At the beginning of each 10-round block, employ-
ees were informed of the bonus rate for that block.
Employees were not told what bonus rates would
be in subsequent blocks. Treatments differed in what
happened before employees made their effort deci-
sion. In each round of the No Help and Symmetric
Costs treatments, the four employees of a firm simul-
taneously chose their effort levels for the round. While
choosing, the employees were shown a payoff table,
similar to Tables 1 and 2, showing their payoff as a
function of their own effort level and the minimum
effort level chosen by the other employees. This pay-
off table was automatically adjusted to reflect the cur-
rent bonus rate. Subjects also had a printed copy of
the payoff table for employees with different effort
costs.
At the end of each round, all employees saw a feed-
back screen showing them their effort level, the min-
imum effort for their firm, their payoff for the round,
and their running total payoff for the experiment.
Separate windows on the feedback screen showed a
summary of results from earlier rounds and the indi-
vidual effort levels selected for all four employees
in their firm. These effort levels were sorted from
highest to lowest and did not include any identifying
information about which employee was responsible
for which effort level.9
Subjects in treatments involving help received addi-
tional printed instruction before the start of the
second block explaining how help worked. These
instructions explained the way in which help could
take place and provided all possible payoff tables
that could occur for either type of player with some
feasible level of help. Subjects were not told about
the possibility of help prior to this point in time, so
all treatments are parallel until the beginning of the
second block. Subjects in the No Help and Symmet-
ric Costs treatments did not receive new instructions
prior to the second block but did have a pause in play
where they were told about changes in the bonus rate
and (when relevant) cost structure.
The timing of rounds 11–30 in the Endogenous
Help treatment (as well as subsequent treatments
with help) differs from that in the other two treat-
ments of Experiment 1. After seeing the feed-
back from the previous round, the high-ability type
selected a level of help. All employees saw the level of
help selected, as well as the resulting costs for the two
9 Given the symmetry of help, the absence of identifying informa-
tion seemed to us to be the simplest choice.
types, and then simultaneously made effort decisions.
The payoff table shown while making this decision
adjusted to reflect the amount of help provided by the
high-ability type. Printed payoff tables were available
to see the payoffs of the other type.
At the end of the session, each subject was privately
paid in cash for all rounds played plus a show-up fee.
The average total payoff was E21.60, including a E5
show-up fee.
5. Initial Results and a
New Treatment
Figure 1 shows average minimum effort in the four
treatments of Experiment 1, including the Forced
Commitment treatment that we introduce below. In
round 10, the last round prior to the bonus rate
increase, all firms had a minimum effort of zero. This
is important since a history of low effort is a precon-
dition for our environment to be of interest.
Figure 1 shows that minimum effort is slightly
lower in the Endogenous Help treatment than in the
No Help sessions and higher in the Symmetric Costs
treatment than in either the Endogenous Help or
No Help treatments. Comparing average effort at the
employee level (rather than minimum effort at the
firm level) yields a similar picture.
Regression analysis contained in Table B.1 of Online
Appendix B provides formal statistical backing for the
preceding observations. The ordered probit regres-
sions reported in Online Appendix B correct for clus-
tering at the group level and include controls for
behavior in the initial phase, rounds 1–10. The regres-
sion results reinforce our conclusions from the raw
data: endogenous help does not significantly increase
firm production (as measured by minimum effort)
relative to the baseline given by the No Help treat-
ment. Although the Symmetric Costs treatment some-
what improves matters, the difference between this
treatment and the No Help treatment is also not
significant. The only significant difference we find
between the three initial treatments is between the
Endogenous Help and Symmetric Costs treatments in
rounds 21–30, and this is very weak. The data reject
Hypothesis 1.
Comparisons of payoffs across the three initial
treatments reveal surprising patterns. Payoffs for
high-ability (low-cost) types are identical in the Sym-
metric Costs and Endogenous Help treatments, aver-
aging 350 ECUs over rounds 11–30, but they are
substantially lower in both cases than the average
payoff of 455 ECUs with no help.10 Payoffs for low-
ability (high-cost) types are roughly the same in the
10 Running ordinary least squares regressions with high-ability-type
profits as the dependent variable and using equivalent specifica-
tions to those described in Online Appendix B, the difference in
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Figure 1 (Color online) Minimum Effort
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Endogenous Help and No Help treatments, averaging
278 and 264 ECUs, respectively, across rounds 11–30.
Both of these figures are substantially lower than the
average payoff for the Symmetric Costs treatment
across this time frame, 348 ECUs.11 It is not a shock
that endogenous help makes high-ability types worse
off—after all, help is costly—but it is surprising that
endogenous help does not make low-ability types bet-
ter off even though they benefit from receiving help.
Conclusion 1. Endogenous help and symmetric costs
do not improve firm productivity, as measured by mini-
mum effort. The data do not support Hypothesis 1.
One possible explanation for why the Endogenous
Help treatment does not increase minimum effort lev-
els relative to the No Help treatment could be that
help is used infrequently or at very low levels. How-
ever, (strictly) positive help is provided in 70% of
observations, 37 of 39 high-ability types (95%) pro-
vide positive help at least once, and 36 of 39 high-
ability types (92%) provide positive help in at least
25% of the rounds. An average of 1.21 units of help
per low-ability type are provided, a level that changes
little over time. The lack of a positive effect from the
high-ability-type payoffs between the No Help and the Endoge-
nous Help (Symmetric Costs) treatments is statistically significant
at the 5% (1%) level in rounds 11–20 and at the 10% (10%) level in
rounds 21–30.
11 Regression analysis finds that the differences in low-ability-type
payoffs between the Symmetric Costs treatment and the Endoge-
nous Help and No Help treatments are statistically significant in
rounds 11–20 at the 5% level and at the 1% level in rounds 21–30.
Endogenous Help treatment does not reflect a failure
by high-ability types to use their ability to provide
help.
Looking at changes in help rather than levels
provides a better idea for why minimum effort is
unexpectedly low in the Endogenous Help treatment.
High-ability types frequently changed how much
help they provided. The median number of changes
in 20 rounds was 6, or roughly one change every three
rounds. About a quarter of the high-ability types, 10
of 39, changed the level of help in at least half of the
rounds. There are only three help levels that get fre-
quent use, so many high-ability types oscillated back
and forth between high and low help levels. Figure 2
shows the relation between the number of changes
in help and both the minimum effort levels of low-
ability types and the payoffs of high-ability types.
Firms from the Endogenous Help treatment are bro-
ken into categories by how many times the level of
help was changed in rounds 11–30. There is an obvi-
ous negative relationship between instability in help
levels and either minimum effort or profit levels.
Frequent changes to the level of help imply both
frequent increases and frequent decreases. Figure 3
illustrates why the decreases are particularly harm-
ful. It shows the effect of the high-ability type chang-
ing the level of help on the average minimum effort
level of the three low-ability types in a firm.12 Data
are taken from rounds 12–30. Round 11 is excluded
12 An observation here is the minimum effort by the three low-
ability types in a firm for a single round.
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Figure 2 (Color online) Frequency of Changing Help, Minimum Effort, and High-Ability-Type Profits
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since the effect of help is confounded with the bonus
rate increase. Changes in the amount of help unam-
biguously affect the minimum effort of the three low-
ability types. When the lagged minimum effort of the
low-ability types is 0, an increase is the only possi-
ble change. Such improvement mainly occurs when
help is increased. If the lagged minimum effort for
the three low-ability types is 40, only decreases are
possible. This is far more likely after a decrease in the
level of help. The most interesting case is when the
lagged minimum effort level for low-ability types is
10, 20, or 30. Given that most groups that successfully
coordinate do so gradually, these cases are critical in
determining a firm’s success. Increasing help or hold-
ing it constant only has a moderately positive effect
on minimum effort levels for low-ability types, but
decreasing help has a strong negative effect on their
minimum effort levels.13
Ordered probit regressions (see Table B.2 in Online
Appendix B) provide formal evidence that the
response of low-ability types’ minimum effort to
changes in help is asymmetric. These regressions
include controls for the lagged minimum effort of low-
ability types, time effects, and individual effects. Sum-
marizing the results, either increasing or decreasing
help leads to statistically significant changes in the
13 The response of individual effort levels to changes in help are
also asymmetric but less so than minimum effort of the low-ability
types. The minimum function accentuates the asymmetry.
minimum effort of low-ability types. By itself, the cur-
rent level of help does not have a significant relation-
ship with changes in effort. Changing help, not the
level of help, causes changes in effort. The negative
effect of decreasing help is estimated to be almost three
times as large as the positive effect of increasing help.
Given the large negative consequences of decreas-
ing help, it is puzzling that high-ability types fre-
quently change the level of help. Two features of
the data suggest an explanation for this behavior.
First, decreases in help primarily occur when lagged
minimum effort is high.14 Just as things start going
well, high-ability types tend to throw a wrench in the
works by decreasing help. This is consistent with pre-
mature attempts at profit taking by high-ability types.
We conjecture that high-ability types are too opti-
mistic about having gotten the firm out of its perfor-
mance trap and reduce the help they provide, failing
to anticipate a drop in the effort of others. A sec-
ond feature of our data supports this interpretation.
Consider observations in rounds 12–30, where the
minimum effort of others in the previous round was
strictly positive (10, 20, 30, or 40). When help is cut,
93% of high-ability types either choose the same effort
level as the previous period or increase it. Increased
effort is more than four times as likely as decreased
effort.15 This tendency by high-ability types to couple
14 A decrease of help is 70% more likely than an increase when the
lagged minimum effort of low-ability types is strictly positive.
15 There are 23 increases and 5 decreases out of 69 total observa-
tions. If we limit the sample to cases where the lagged effort was
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Figure 3 (Color online) Effect of Changing Help on Low-Ability-Type Minimum Effort (Rounds 12–30)
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decreases in help with increases in their own effort
only makes sense if the low-ability workers are not
expected to react to the decrease in help by cutting
their effort.
Conclusion 2. Our analysis of the dynamics in the
Endogenous Help treatment suggests that a lack of commit-
ment by high-ability types, especially a tendency to slash
help when things are going well, leads to poor performance
in the treatment.
Conclusion 2 is largely based on the negative rela-
tionship between frequent changes in help and the
minimum effort achieved by a firm, as illustrated by
Figure 2, but the evidence provided by the Endoge-
nous Help treatment is not sufficient to establish a
causal relation between these two variables. Frequent
switches might be caused by poor performance rather
than the other way around. The Forced Commit-
ment treatment, the final treatment in Experiment 1,
is designed to establish a causal relationship between
commitment and increased minimum effort.16 In this
neither 0 nor 40, so that changes in both directions are possible,
these figures become 14 increases and 3 decreases out of 27 total
observations.
16 The Symmetric Costs treatment also introduces an element of
commitment, since workers are told in rounds 11 and 21 that effort
costs will be set equal across all four workers for the next 10
rounds. This is mathematically equivalent to imposing a commit-
ment to provide two units of help. However, the comparison with
the Endogenous Help treatment is not clean as a result of multi-
ple confounds: help is forced to be at a high level, help cannot be
adjusted in reaction to the initial response of the low-ability types,
treatment, the high-ability (low-cost) type chooses
how much help to provide only in rounds 11 and
21. In these two rounds, she sets the level of help
in exactly the same fashion as in the Endogenous
Help treatment, choosing from H ∈ 811213149. The
effort cost of all three low-ability (high-cost) types is
lowered by H and the high-ability type’s effort cost
increases by 3H . As in the Endogenous Help treat-
ment, the same amount of help must be provided
to all three low-ability types. Unlike the Endogenous
Help treatment, where help is chosen for each round,
in the Forced Commitment treatment the high-ability
type must stick to his decision for the entire 10-round
block. This prevents the frequent changes to the level
of help observed in the Endogenous Help treatment.
Effort levels are still chosen round by round as in the
other treatments.
Hypothesis 2 follows from our interpretation of
behavior in the Endogenous Help treatment. With-
out forced commitment, overly optimistic high-ability
types tend to decrease help too soon. In the presence
of forced commitment, this premature reduction of
help is not possible, facilitating successful equilibra-
tion at a higher effort level.17
and help is imposed exogenously rather than being set by one of
the four workers.
17 When looking at the data from the first three treatments of Exper-
iment 1, we noticed that groups that performed poorly were often
held back by low effort choices from a single worker. This sug-
gested that allowing for asymmetric provision of help, with dif-
ferent levels of help provided to different workers, might be more
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Hypothesis 2. Minimum effort will be higher for the
Forced Commitment treatment than for either the No Help
or Endogenous Help treatment.
Returning to Figure 1, we now focus on the Forced
Commitment treatment. This treatment yields obvi-
ously higher minimum efforts than either the No
Help or Endogenous Help treatment, a difference
that grows between the first and second block. Mini-
mum efforts in the Forced Commitment treatment are
also moderately higher than in the Symmetric Costs
treatment for both blocks. Looking at effort rather
than minimum effort leads to similar conclusions—
the Forced Commitment treatment leads to a substan-
tial and persistent increase in effort levels over the No
Help and Endogenous Help treatments.
Payoffs improve for both types in the Forced Com-
mitment treatment relative to the Endogenous Help
treatment, with average payoffs over rounds 11–30
of 413 versus 350 ECUs for high-ability types and
348 versus 278 ECUs for low-ability types. Over the
final 10 rounds, average payoffs for both types are
(roughly) as high in the Forced Commitment treat-
ment as in the best of the other three treatments.18
The regression analysis described in Table B.1 of
Online Appendix B supports our conclusions about
forced commitment. Compared with either the No
Help or Endogenous Help treatments, the Forced
Commitment treatment leads to significantly higher
minimum effort and effort levels in rounds 21–30 than
in either the No Help or Endogenous Help treat-
ments. Payoffs for both types in the final block are
also significantly higher in the Forced Commitment
treatment than in the Endogenous Help treatment. For
low-ability types, payoffs in both blocks are also sig-
nificantly higher than in the No Help treatment. As
should be expected, since help is costly, the difference
in high-ability payoffs between the Forced Commit-
ment and No Help treatments is never statistically
significant.
Conclusion 3. The Forced Commitment treatment
has a large persistent effect on effort. Compared with the No
Help treatment, the Forced Commitment treatment makes
low-ability types better off without harming the high-ability
types. The data support Hypothesis 2.
effective than the symmetric help allowed in the Endogenous Help
treatment. We tested this hypothesis with a treatment that allowed
asymmetric provision of help. This improved minimum effort lev-
els, but the effect was small and not statistically significant. Details
are available from the authors.
18 For high-ability types, average payoffs over rounds 21–30 are 476
ECUs, 381 ECUs, 377 ECUs, and 467 ECUs in the No Help, Sym-
metric Costs, Endogenous Help, and Forced Commitment treat-
ments, respectively. Analogous figures for low-ability types are 288
ECUs, 383 ECUs, 302 ECUs, and 377 ECUs.
The positive effect of forced commitment is prob-
ably not due to an increase in the level of help
offered, as the average level of help over rounds 11–
30 is higher in the Forced Commitment treatment
than in the Endogenous Help treatment (1.40 versus
1.21) but not dramatically so.19 As in the Endoge-
nous Help treatment, high-ability types in the Forced
Commitment treatment often cut help for successfully
coordinated firms—of 12 firms coordinated at 40 in
round 20, 4 cut help for the second block. The differ-
ence between the Endogenous Help and Forced Com-
mitment treatments is that forced commitment gives
time for groups to strongly converge to a new equi-
librium in the first block with help (rounds 11–20).
In the groups where play was coordinated at 40 in
round 20 and help decreased for the final block, all
four employees had been choosing 40 since at least
round 14. These groups had a firmly established norm
of coordinating on the efficient outcome. Two of the
groups saw a brief decrease in round 21, in both cases
due to a change by a single employee, but every
employee in these four groups chose effort level 40
in rounds 22–30. Increasing help for the final block
leads to increased minimum effort, but, unlike the
Endogenous Help treatment, a decrease in help in the
Forced Commitment treatment does not cause a decrease in
effort by low-ability types. For the seven groups where
help decreased, the average minimum effort increased
slightly between blocks (23.7 for rounds 11–20 ver-
sus 24 for rounds 21–30). In the five groups where
help increased for rounds 21–30, the average mini-
mum effort increased strongly between the two blocks
(from 5.2 to 25.6). With forced commitment, changes
in help push effort up rather than down. We con-
jecture that forcing commitment gives the time for
strong convergence to the efficient equilibrium to
occur before the high-ability types can disrupt things
by cutting help, a conjecture formally examined by
the model contained in §6.
6. A Structural Model of Behavior
in Experiment 1
We now introduce a structural model designed to
explore the causes of the two key observations from
Experiment 1: (1) forced commitment leads to an
increase in minimum effort relative to no help and
endogenous help, and (2) high-ability types in the
Endogenous Help treatment cut help prematurely,
undermining the positive effects of having provided
help. We develop a model that reproduces these fea-
tures. In §5 we conjectured that overoptimism by
19 Running a t-test on the average help provided low-ability types,
the difference is not statistically significant at even the 10% level
(59 observations; t = 0098, p= 0033).
Brandts et al.: Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games
2928 Management Science 62(10), pp. 2916–2936, © 2016 INFORMS
high-ability types plays an important role in gener-
ating these regularities by encouraging high-ability
types to abandon help prematurely. Going beyond
intuition, the fitting exercise directly tests whether
allowing for overoptimism significantly improves the
model’s fit to the data and improves its ability to track
differences between the treatments. Reciprocity could
also play a role in driving the dynamics, a proposition
tested through the fitting exercise.
6.1. Model Specification
Our basic model is a simplified version of the sophis-
ticated EWA model of Camerer et al. (2002). The
technical details are given in Online Appendix C.
The model includes two types of individuals, unso-
phisticated and sophisticated learners. Individuals
are randomly assigned types with the probability of
being a sophisticated type given by the parameter
. Note that both high- and low-ability types are
equally likely to be sophisticated learners, as the abil-
ity type (high or low) is assigned exogenously by
the experimenter, whereas the individual’s learning
type (sophisticated or unsophisticated) is an exoge-
nous characteristic of the individual subject.
Unsophisticated players follow a simple adaptive
learning rule closely related to Cournot learning.
The choice of Cournot learning rather than a more
flexible learning rule such as noisy fictitious play,
reinforcement learning, or EWA is driven by the struc-
ture of information in the experiment. Sophisticated
learners have to be able to model the learning of
unsophisticated types. In our experiment, subjects can
observe the choices of the other three individuals in
their group but not in a way that is identifiable. This
means that it is impossible to track an individual’s
choices across periods.20 Modeling Cournot learning
by others does not require this information, but mod-
els such as noisy fictitious play, reinforcement learn-
ing, and EWA require the ability to track individuals
across periods. We therefore use a model that does not
require sophisticated types to use information they do
not possess.
There are two types of unsophisticated learners that
vary only in their initial beliefs about others’ behavior.
Optimists initially believe that all other players will
choose 40, the highest possible effort level, whereas
pessimists initially believe that all other players will
choose 0.21 The initial beliefs of an unsophisticated
20 For example, suppose in two consecutive periods, the effort
choices by the other three players in my group are 40, 20, and 30 fol-
lowed by 20, 40, and 30. My feedback displays choices ordered from
highest to lowest without IDs. So in both periods I receive feedback
showing 40, 30, and 20. I have no way of knowing whether or not
individuals have changed their effort levels between periods.
21 Adding these types helps the model capture the bimodal dis-
tribution of behavior in the data. Adding more types (or more
type are randomly drawn, with parameter  giving
the probability of a pessimist. After each decision
round, unsophisticated players update their beliefs,
with the new beliefs being a weighted average of the
other group members’ effort levels in the previous
round and initial beliefs given by
qit4m5 = 4t5it4m5+41−4t55qu14m5
for u∈ {optimist, pessimist} and ∀m0 (1)
Specifically, an unsophisticated player’s beliefs
qit4m5 give weights for each possible minimum effort
m ∈ 801101201301409 for the other three players. The
weight on the previous round’s outcome is given by
4t5. This weight changes over time according to (2),
where  is a parameter fit from the data, 415= 0, and
425= ¯ (¯ is also a parameter fit from the data). The
function it4m5 gives the weight on minimum effort
m if the probability of each effort level is given by
the observed frequency in the preceding period,22 and
qu14m5 is the initial weight on minimum effort m sub-
ject to the individual’s type (optimist or pessimist).
The model allows for a reset of beliefs in round 11 to
account for the underlying game changing when the
bonus rate is increased, and possibly, help is allowed.
This is captured by subtracting the parameter  from
4105, which puts less weight on experience from
round 10 and more weight on initial beliefs:
4t5=4t− 15+ if t ≥ 30 (2)
Based on these beliefs, expected payoffs can be gen-
erated for each of the five available effort levels. These
are transformed into “attractions” by adding extra
weight to the effort level that was chosen in the pre-
vious period, where the extra weight is given by a
parameter  multiplied by the number of times the
same choice has been repeated. Putting extra weight
on repeated choices allows the model to capture the
fairly obvious hysteresis in the data. Earlier papers
have found that incorporating hysteresis into a learn-
ing model significantly improved the fit (i.e., Cooper
and Stockman 2002, Camerer et al. 2002, Wilcox 2006).
The choice of an unsophisticated type is gener-
ated from beliefs using a logit decision rule, with the
parameter  determining the level of noise. In the
sophisticated versions of heterogeneous initial beliefs) complicates
the model, making it more difficult to fit, without improving its
ability to track the experimental data.
22 For example, suppose the other three group members chose 0, 20,
and 40 in the preceding period. Unsophisticated types then assign
a probability of 1/3 to each of these three effort levels. A proba-
bility distribution over the others’ minimum effort is generated by
assuming that each of the other three individual group member’s
effort levels is independently drawn with equal probability over 0,
20, and 40.
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Endogenous Help and Forced Commitment treat-
ments, we also have to model help decisions by
unsophisticated high-ability types. This is done in
a manner that parallels the choice of effort levels
described above, although a separate noise parameter,
H , is estimated for the choice of help.
Sophisticated types anticipate the learning of unso-
phisticated types and are forward looking, engag-
ing in strategic teaching. They understand that their
current actions affect the beliefs of unsophisticated
players in the subsequent round. This makes help
attractive as a tool for pushing unsophisticated types
toward higher effort levels.
Going into details, sophisticated types assume
that all of the other group members are unsophis-
ticated types. This departs from the sophisticated
EWA model in which sophisticated types place posi-
tive weight on other players also being sophisticated
types. Our model therefore does not nest quantal
response equilibrium and is more in the spirit of a
level-k model. If sophisticated types believe that oth-
ers may also be sophisticated, it becomes necessary
to calculate a fixed point as part of fitting the model,
greatly increasing the computational complexity of
the exercise. Given that our model does a good job
of tracking the data and gives useful insights into the
underlying processes, we opt for the simpler model.
Sophisticated types have all the information neces-
sary to calculate beliefs and attractions for the other
three members of their group (assuming that the oth-
ers are unsophisticated). Applying the relevant logit
decision rule, they can generate a distribution over
choices and minimum efforts for the other three group
members. These serve as a sophisticated type’s beliefs
about current actions. Sophisticated types also have
all the information needed to generate a probability
distribution over the beliefs of unsophisticated types
in the upcoming period and, by extension, to gener-
ate a distribution over the future choices of others as
a function of their own current choice.
Based on their beliefs about current and future
actions by the other three players, sophisticated types
calculate expected current and future payoffs as a
function of their current actions (effort and, if a high-
ability type, help). Choices are reached via a logit
decision rule where attractions are given by the sum
of expected payoffs for the current and upcoming
periods.23
Based on specific features of our data described
above, we added two features to the basic model.
1. Overoptimism: The basic model assumes sophis-
ticated types have a correctly specified model of how
23 To simplify the model, equal weight is put on current and future
expected payoffs, and the noise parameter is assumed to be the
same for sophisticated and unsophisticated types.
unsophisticated types form beliefs and then make
choices. We depart from this assumption by allow-
ing for overoptimism by sophisticated types. Sophis-
ticated types may believe that unsophisticated types
learn faster from experience (are more responsive
to new information) than is the case in reality and
therefore may be overly optimistic about their abil-
ity to affect the beliefs of unsophisticated types. This
is incorporated into the model by allowing for the
possibility that sophisticated types overestimate the
weight that unsophisticated players give to observed
past behavior versus their initial beliefs. Specifically,
sophisticated types calculating the beliefs of unso-
phisticated types replace 4t5 with 4t5+, where 
is an overoptimism parameter fit from the data.
2. Reciprocity: Reciprocity is an important feature
of many environments, and it seems plausible that it
could play a role here as well. When a high-ability
type increases the level of help, she (weakly) helps
the low-ability types and harms herself. Likewise,
decreasing help (weakly) harms the low-ability types
and helps the high-ability type. The preceding implies
that increasing help can be seen as a kind action by
the high-ability type, whereas decreasing help can
be seen as unkind. If the preferences of low-ability
types incorporate reciprocity, they should want to
reward the high-ability types following an increase
in help and punish them after a decrease. This can
be done within a weak-link game via changes in
their effort levels since, in a weak-link game with
stochastic choice, the expected payoffs of the other
players are a strictly increasing function of my own
effort. From a dynamic point of view, reciprocity can
affect the model’s predictions because it accentuates
responses to changing levels of help. We therefore
wanted to test for the presence of reciprocity and
determine whether the addition of reciprocity to the
model would improve its ability to capture the main
features of Experiment 1.
To incorporate reciprocity into our model, we allow
the attractions for a low-ability type, as a function
of the low-ability type’s effort, to include weights on
the expected payoff of the high-ability type. Positive
weight is put on the high-ability type’s expected pay-
off if he has been kind by increasing the amount of
help provided. The amount of weight put on the high-
ability type’s expected payoff in these circumstances
is given by the parameter , which is fit from the
data.24 This is a simple and intuitive way of adding
reciprocity to the model, similar to the way reciprocity
24 For simplicity, we assume that this weight is equal for positive
and negative reciprocity. We doubt these weights are truly equal
given experimental results to the contrary (i.e., Offerman 2002), but
allowing for greater weight on negative reciprocity would not affect
the intuition underlying our results.
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is added to the Charness and Rabin (2002) model,
and it has a natural effect on the choices of low-
ability types. Low-ability types try to help (harm)
high-ability types who have helped (harmed) them
by choosing a higher (lower) effort than they would
otherwise select. Reciprocity is applied to attractions
for both unsophisticated and sophisticated low-ability
types.
6.2. Model Results
The full model’s parameters were fit to data from
the three treatments of interest—No Help, Endoge-
nous Help, and Forced Commitment—using the sim-
ulated method of moments. See Online Appendix C
for details on how the model was fit to the data,
but fitting the model roughly involves the following.
Starting with a given set of parameters, we simulate
the model for 1,000 groups in all three treatments.
For each period in each treatment, we calculate the
difference between the observed average minimum
effort and the simulated average minimum effort.
Squaring these differences and then taking the sum
across periods and treatments gives us our measure
of fit. The parameters are adjusted to minimize the
sum of squared differences. In other words, we are
picking the parameters that most closely track the
observed minimum effort averaging across periods
and treatments. The estimated parameters and stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) are presented in Table 5.
All of the parameters are significantly different from
zero, except for , the time trend for the weight unso-
phisticated types’ beliefs put on their most recent
experience, and, surprisingly, the reciprocity parame-
ter . We estimate that a high proportion (65.7%) of
subjects are sophisticated types. The estimated frac-
tion of pessimistic unsophisticated types is quite low,
0.089, so most unsophisticated types are optimists.
Finally, the overoptimism parameter is significant and
positive. Sophisticated types believe that unsophis-
ticated types are putting significantly more weight
(about 23% more) on their most recent experience
than is actually the case.
Using the parameters that best fit the data, we look
at simulated data for each of the three treatments.
Figure 4 compares the average minimum efforts in
the experimental (top left panel) and simulated (top
right panel) data. The simulated data reproduces the
two main regularities of the experimental data: forced
commitment leads to an increase in minimum effort
relative to no help, but endogenous help does not.
It is not true that any learning model fit to the
data would reproduce the main features of the data.
A model’s goodness of fit is being measured by the
squared sum of differences between simulated and
observed minimum efforts averaging across periods and
treatments. A model that fits well on average can still
Table 5 Parameter Estimates of the Structural Model
Parameter Explanation Estimate
 Overoptimism 00046
4000045
 Reciprocity 00012
4000455
 Fraction of sophisticated players 00657
4000575
 Fraction of optimists 00089
4000055
¯ Initial belief weight 00202
4000085
 Hysteresis 00303
4000235
 Belief weight slope term 00178 × 10 − 4
(10175 × 10 − 4)
 Reset of belief weight 00086
4000065
 Logit function parameter 00072
4000025
H Logit parameter for help decisions 00410
4001375
— Sum of squared errors 5230861
fail to track the data from any one treatment or dif-
ferences across treatments. This point is illustrated by
three alternative models to the data. The first only
includes unsophisticated learners. Mathematically, we
impose a constraint that = 0, where  is the fraction
of sophisticated types. The second is the basic model
with unsophisticated and sophisticated learners but
no overoptimism or reciprocity. Here, the constraints
on the full model are = 0 and = 0, where  and 
are the parameters governing the strength of overop-
timism and reciprocity, respectively. The third adds
reciprocity but not overoptimism to the main model.
The sole constraint imposed in this case is = 0.
The middle left panel of Figure 4 shows simulation
results for the model with only unsophisticated learn-
ers, and the middle right panel shows simulations for
the basic model. In both cases, even though the mod-
els’ parameters are chosen to best fit the data, there
is no discernable difference between the three treat-
ments.25 The model with reciprocity but no overopti-
mism (lower left panel) does only slightly better, with
only tiny differences between the treatments.
Not only does reciprocity receive little weight in the
fitted version of the full model, but artificially adding
reciprocity to the model harms its ability to track
differences between treatments. To show this, we fit
a model constrained to have a higher level of reci-
procity ( ≥ 1) than the low fitted value (= 00012).
Simulated data for this model are shown in the
25 It may not appear that there are three lines in these two panels,
but this is because they are on top of each other.
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Figure 4 (Color online) Comparison of Experimental and Simulated Data
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lower right panel of Figure 4. It correctly has average
minimum effort higher in forced commitment than
no help, but it has equally high average minimum
effort for endogenous commitment. In the experimen-
tal data, the average minimum effort for endoge-
nous commitment is significantly lower than in forced
commitment.
To understand why sophistication and overopti-
mism receive significant weight in the fitted version
of the full model but reciprocity does not, consider
how changing the learning model affects use of help.
Unsophisticated learners treat their group members
as a fixed statistical distribution, failing to recognize
that changes in incentives will change their behav-
ior. Since high-ability types only benefit from help if
it affects the behavior of low-ability types, unsophis-
ticated learners do not anticipate any benefits from
help. Virtually no help is provided in the fitted model
with only unsophisticated types—only 0.2% of the
high-ability types ever use help in simulations of the
Endogenous Help treatment. Given that help does not
get used, it follows that changing how help can be
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used will not matter. This leads to the lack of differ-
ences between treatments shown in the middle left
panel of Figure 4.
In the basic model (i.e., no reciprocity or overop-
timism), help still gets almost no use. In the sim-
ulations, only 0.5% of the high-ability types ever
use help in the Endogenous Help treatment. Once
again, it follows that changing how help can be
used will be irrelevant. Adding overoptimism gets
two important features. High-ability types think low-
ability types will respond more to the provision of
help than they actually do, making them more willing
to use help. The percentage of high-ability types who
use help at least once in simulations of the Endoge-
nous Help treatment rises to 65% in the full model.
But because they overestimate how much they have
affected low-ability types’ beliefs after providing help,
overoptimistic high-ability types are too willing to
abandon help. Switches in help are almost evenly split
between increases and decreases (high-ability types
average 0.81 increases and 0.75 decreases) as high-
ability types who adopt help tend to rapidly abandon
it, undercutting its positive effect. With forced com-
mitment, the high-ability types can no longer aban-
don help, allowing minimum effort to converge to
higher levels in simulation of the full model. The
mechanism underlying the differences between treat-
ments in simulations of the full model is similar to
the mechanism in the experimental data.
Use of help also explains the little role reciprocity
plays in the ability of the model to track the exper-
imental data. Like overoptimism, reciprocity makes
help more attractive since the positive response to
increasing help is larger. In the model with artificially
high reciprocity (≥ 1), the percentage of high-ability
types who use help at least once in simulations of the
Endogenous Help treatment is still relatively high at
37.5%. However, reciprocity also accentuates the neg-
ative response of low-ability types to a decrease in
help. Since sophisticated learners model the decision
process of other players and therefore anticipate this
effect, reciprocity makes decreasing help less attrac-
tive. In the model with artificially high reciprocity,
there are far fewer decreases than increases (an aver-
age of 1.34 increases versus 0.52 decreases). Reci-
procity gets little weight in the full model because
it undermines a critical feature, premature decreases
of help. It is worth noting that other modifications
to the model that accentuate the negative response to
decreased help, such as adding inequality aversion to
the utility function, would likewise fail to improve the
model’s performance.
A pair of observations, one about the data and
one about the simulations, makes it less surprising
that the full model puts little weight on reciprocity.
The strong negative reaction to reductions in help
in the Endogenous Help treatment was an impor-
tant piece of evidence for reciprocity, but this reaction
is not present in the Forced Commitment treatment.
In groups where help is reduced prior to round 21,
the mean (and median) change in effort by low-
ability types between rounds 20 and 21 is 0. Given
that reducing help for the final 10 periods is an
irreversible action that harms the low-ability types,
reciprocity should be highly relevant in this partic-
ular case. The data from the Forced Commitment
treatment are more consistent with groups having
converged to equilibrium and hence not being desta-
bilized by reduced help than reciprocity.
In the experimental data from the Endogenous
Help treatment, we documented an asymmetric
response of minimum effort by the low-ability
types to changes in the level of help (see Fig-
ure 3 and accompanying text). Generating asymmet-
ric responses to changes of help does not require
reciprocity. In simulations of the full model, where
reciprocity is largely absent in the fitted parameters,
the minimum effort of the three low-ability types
increases by an average of 4.54 in response to an
increase in the help level and falls by an average of
10.00 in response to a decrease in the help level.
We do not claim that the structural model presented
above perfectly tracks the experimental data or pro-
vides the best possible fit. We have simplified the
model in many ways to make it easier to implement,
and a more complex model could no doubt improve
the fit.26 Indeed, in future work we plan to explore
ways the model can be improved as well as experi-
mental tests of the learning model.
To summarize, we learn three important things
from fitting the learning model. (1) A relatively simple
structural model is able to track the most important
features of the data from Experiment 1: adding help
does not increase minimum effort when high-ability
types are free to adjust help in the Endogenous Help
treatment but does yield an increase when they are
forced to commit in the Forced Commitment treat-
ment. (2) It is not true that any learning model fit to
the data would track these features. Models without
sophisticated learners or with sophisticated learners
but lacking overoptimism cannot reproduce the rel-
ative effects of Endogenous Help and Forced Com-
mitment treatments.27 (3) Adding reciprocity to the
model, either alone or coupled with overoptimism,
does not help the model’s ability to explain the main
26 Alternatives we are exploring include making sophisticated types
better at predicting the future, using more data from past periods,
and changing the specification to capture hysteresis.
27 The importance of sophisticated learners adds to existing evi-
dence (notably Camerer et al. 2002) of the importance of sophisti-
cated learners in tracking experimental data.
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treatment effects. This stems from the interaction
between reciprocity and sophistication; reciprocity
makes high-ability types who are sophisticated learn-
ers less willing to help since they correctly anticipate
a strong negative response.
Conclusion 4. A model containing unsophisticated
learners and sophisticated learners with overoptimism cap-
tures key regularities of the experimental data. Overopti-
mism is necessary to capture the main features of the data,
but adding reciprocity to the model is not necessary.
7. Experiment 2: Direct Help
In this section we model help as being direct rather
than indirect: high-ability types provide help by doing
some of the work of low-ability types. The new treat-
ments parallel the Endogenous Help and Endogenous
Help with Forced Commitment treatments. A low
bonus rate (B = 8) is used in rounds 1–10 to trap
groups at low effort levels and then raised to B = 14
for rounds 11–30. High-ability types can help low-
ability types in rounds 11–30 by choosing a level of
help before the four workers make effort choices. The
difference between Experiments 1 and 2 is how help is
provided. In addition to working on his own task (up
to a maximum of 40 hours), the high-ability type can
also allocate time in 10-hour units to the low-ability
types’ tasks. To keep help efficiency neutral, the effort
cost of a high-ability type doing the work of a low-
ability type is the same (9 ECUs/hour) as it would
be for a low-ability type. Intuitively, we model costs
as reflecting the difficulty of the tasks rather than
the ability of the workers, but high-ability types can
work more hours than low-ability types.28 The same
amount of help must be given to each low-ability
type. When help is provided, the “effective” number
of hours provided by a low-ability worker is the sum
of the hours received as help plus the hours worked
directly by the low-ability worker.
Table 6 shows the payoff tables for high- and low-
ability types if one unit (10 hours) of help is pro-
vided.29 In the payoff table for high-ability types (left
panel), the minimum effort level by other employees
goes from 10 to 50 (instead of 0 to 40), since the high-
ability type has provided 10 hours of work to each
of the low-ability types. Similarly, in the payoff table
for low-ability types (right panel) the effective hours
provided by a worker go from 10 to 50 reflecting the
28 To keep the basic structure of the game fixed, we let the high-
ability type work more than 40 hours but restricted the amount he
could work on his own task.
29 Subjects were allowed to provide more units of help, but this is
sufficiently expensive that we did not anticipate higher levels of
help being used. On rare occasions we observed provision of two
units of help.
Table 6 Payoff Tables: High-Ability Type Provides One Unit
(10 Hours) of Help
Ci = 1
Minimum effective effort
by other employees
Effort by
employee 1 at own job 10 20 30 40 50
0 −70 −70 −70 −70 −70
10 60 60 60 60 60
20 50 190 190 190 190
30 40 180 320 320 320
40 30 170 310 450 450
Ci = 9
Minimum effective effort by
other employees on own job
Effort by employee
2, 3, or 4 at own job 0 10 20 30 40
10 200 340 340 340 340
20 110 250 390 390 390
30 20 160 300 440 440
40 −70 70 210 350 490
50 −160 −20 120 260 400
10 hours of help. The minimum effective effort by
other employees can still be zero since the high-ability
worker has the (perverse) option to not work at his
own job.
Coordinating at effective effort levels 10, 20, 30,
and 40 are Nash equilibria of the subgame shown in
Table 6. There are four equilibria rather than five as
previously, but the equilibria remain Pareto-ranked,
the efficient equilibrium remains 40, and the basic
properties of a weak-link game are preserved.
The two treatments with direct help, Direct Help
and Direct Help with Forced Commitment treatments,
parallel the Endogenous Help and Forced Commit-
ment treatments in Experiment 1. The mechanism
through which forced commitment is expected to
have a positive effect on average minimum effort is
the same as for indirect help. Forced commitment
prevents overoptimistic high-ability (low-effort-cost)
types from decreasing help before the equilibration
process has finished. Note that the No Help treatment
from Experiment 1 continues to serve as the baseline.
Hypothesis 3. In the long run, average minimum
effort will be higher in Direct Help than in the No Help
treatment and in Direct Help with Forced Commitment
than in Direct Help treatment.
We ran six additional sessions with 136 subjects
participating in the additional two treatments (56 sub-
jects in Direct Help treatment and 80 in Direct Help
with Forced Commitment treatment). General proce-
dures were identical to the ones described for Exper-
iment 1, and subjects made an average of E19.04.
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Figure 5 (Color online) Minimum Effort in Experiment 2
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Figure 5 shows the average minimum effort for the
two direct help treatments as well as the No Help
treatment from Experiment 1. Note that this is effective
minimum effort, which includes any help provided
by the high-ability type as part of the effort for each
low-ability type. Compared with the No Help treat-
ment, the effect of the Direct Help treatment is dra-
matic and negative. There is a slight increase between
rounds 10 and 11, but average minimum effort sta-
bilizes below 5. The addition of commitment once
improves performance as average minimum effort in
the Direct Help with Forced Commitment treatment
rapidly stabilizes in the neighborhood of 20. Adding
forced commitment to direct help overcomes the mis-
erable performance without commitment but does not
lead to an overall improvement.
Regression analysis described in Online Ap-
pendix B confirms the obvious. Compared with the
No Help treatment, the Direct Help treatment leads
to a statistically significant decrease in effective min-
imum effort. The Direct Help with Forced Commit-
ment treatment has no significant effect relative to
the No Help treatment but significantly improves
effective minimum effort relative to the Direct Help
treatment.
The extraordinarily low minimum effort levels in
direct help are explained in part by factors simi-
lar to those responsible for weak performance in
the Endogenous Help treatment from Experiment 1.
A majority of the high-ability types (8 of 14) try offer-
ing help at least once, and offering help leads to
improved performance. Following an increase in help,
the average effective minimum help increases by an
average of 14.0. The problem is that the lack of com-
mitment by high-ability types is extreme. In 18 of
the 23 cases where help is increased, the increase is
reversed in the following round. There is no case of
help being offered for more than three consecutive
rounds. For every single case where help is decreased,
the minimum effort immediately returns to 0. The
inability of high-ability types in the Direct Help treat-
ment to stick with help undoes any positive effects of
the initial increases. Average effective minimum effort
is actually slightly higher in the groups where help
is never offered (4.2) than in groups where help is
offered at least once (3.0).
Cutting help does not cause effective minimum
effort to collapse in the Direct Help with Commit-
ment treatment. In this treatment, 12 of the 20 high-
ability types offer positive levels of help in round 11.
For rounds 16–20, average minimum effective help
for these 12 groups is 23.8 compared with 7.5 when
no help is provided. Help is eliminated in 10 of the
12 groups for rounds 21–30. The response is nega-
tive but small. Minimum effort falls for 6 of the 10
groups in round 21, but only 2 collapse to a minimum
effort of zero. Comparing the average effective mini-
mum efforts for rounds 16–20 and rounds 26–30, there
is only a slight decrease from 22.6 to 18.8 for these
10 groups. As with indirect help, forced commitment
with direct help allows groups time to converge to
equilibrium so that a later reduction in help is less
disruptive.
Conclusion 5. The effect of direct help is strongly
negative, reducing minimum effort to almost the lowest
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possible level. Forced commitment reverses this effect, but
does not lead to minimum effort levels above the No Help
treatment.
8. Final Remarks
The purpose of this paper is to study whether high-
ability employees can use help as an effective tool for
leading groups out of performance traps. Help turns
out to be a double-edged sword that can harm as
much as it helps. Increasing help leads to improved
performance, but prematurely decreasing help in an
effort to take profits undoes any positive effects from
the initial provision of help. Forcing high-ability types
to commit to a stable level of help over time consis-
tently improves the effect of help on groups’ perfor-
mance in the turnaround game. A relatively simple
structural model shows that the importance of com-
mitment can be attributed to overoptimism, the belief
by sophisticated types that learning by unsophisti-
cated types is faster than is actually the case.
Our work suggests that it is not sufficient for man-
agers to encourage help among workers (for exam-
ple, by forming work teams as in Hamilton et al.
2003). Management must also encourage stability in
how help is provided. This need not be overly compli-
cated. Simply holding a meeting on a monthly basis
where employees discuss what they will do for the
upcoming month, including what help they will pro-
vide others, may serve as a useful device for foster-
ing more stable commitments to help. Keeping work
groups together for an extended period of time rather
than rematching workers may also have the effect of
creating a more stable environment where levels of
help are more likely to be steady.
Our work does not address endogenous commit-
ment to help. It would be useful to know if high-
ability types would take advantage of a commitment
device if one was offered but not required. We believe
that they would not—if subjects understood the value
of commitment, they probably would not be under-
cutting successful coordination in the first place—but
the question is ultimately an empirical one.
Finally, there is a broader point to be taken away
from our work. This paper focuses on the effective-
ness of help in escaping performance traps, but the
importance of commitment is likely to be a more gen-
eral phenomenon. Escaping a performance trap is just
one of many cases where leaders might seek to over-
turn an existing norm in favor of a more socially
desirable one, and help is just one of a multitude
of tools available to potential leaders. Establishing a
new more desirable norm is a gradual process and
one that can be disrupted by negative changes along
many dimensions. As described in the introduction,
the same insights that this paper generates about
excessive switching of help by high-ability workers
also seem to apply to excessive switching of bonus
rates by managers acting as leaders. We imagine there
are many examples where a self-defeating tendency
to declare victory and cease costly attempts at leader-
ship undercuts the benefits of leadership. If our basic
insights generalize, a good strategy for individuals to
follow in attempting to establish a new socially desir-
able norm is to pick an approach and stick with it.
If effective leadership shares a common element of
strategic teaching, even the best of approaches will
fail if used inconsistently.
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